

20046-3
REPORT NO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Egypt/Arab States

DATE DISTR. 27 APR 1949

SUBJECT Views of Arab League Officials on
Revision of League Charter

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE 25X1A
ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO
25X1X

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

Fid
6/3

1. Despite predictions and rumors appearing recently in the Arabic, French, and English press in Egypt that an attempt will be made to modify the constitution of the League of Arab States in order to make execution of its decisions obligatory for all members, several officials within the Secretariat of the League have expressed doubt that any such revision is possible in the near future.
2. These officials point out that, since any alteration of the basic charter of the League would require unanimous ratification by all member states, any state opposing such modification could block it, simply by withholding assent. Should the other states, or any group of them, decide to proceed with the modification, despite the opposition of one or more states presently members of the League, they could form an association under whatever terms they chose, and call it by whatever name they liked. They would, however, no longer have the League of Arab States, but a new organization. Since such an organization probably would increase the gap between the Egyptian and Transjordanian policies, it probably would weaken rather than strengthen the Arab cause as a whole.
3. According to these officials, the present charter of the League represents the maximum concession which several of the Arab states are willing to make toward coordinating their foreign policies with their sister states. The only real sanction of Arab League decisions has been the moral one of Arab public opinion and no stronger sanctions against members who fail to implement League decisions are feasible, unless public opinion in the Arab countries comes to regard general Arab interests as paramount over the interests of individual states and dynasties; that condition does not exist today. The immediate prospect is that League politicians will refrain from putting additional strains on the League and they will not urge questions of charter reform.
4. Active young members of the Arab League Secretariat have expressed the opinion that, for the present, the League would do well to emphasize cooperation among the Arab states in such things as cultural exchanges,

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION				
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR		FBI					Document No.	0000

Document No.

~~NO CHANGE~~ in class

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Class CHANGED TO:

WADA Memo 4

Auth: JDA REC: 97

Date: 12 MAY 28

02600620006-3/10

This document is hereby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
Archivist of the United States.

Next Review Date: 2008 For Release 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: 12 MAY 28

02600620006-3/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

postal conventions, economics, etc. All officials registered a strong dislike for King Abdullah of Transjordan and a deep suspicion of his policy, [REDACTED] 25X6
opposed to Arab or even Transjordanian interests. Current feeling among those with whom source conversed, however, seemed to be that it would be better for Egypt not to break completely with Transjordan at this time by bringing up irreconcilable issues. An attempt probably will be made to present some sort of united front on the question of repatriation and/or indemnification of Arab refugees; such a front would be almost impossible to maintain in the presence of an open and complete rupture between Egypt and Transjordan.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~